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360 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
INTRODUCTION
Government spending on healthcare is expected to exceed $4 trillion
in 2020 and to reach roughly $6.19 trillion by 2028.1 For Medicare alone,
spending is expected to grow at an average annual rate of 7% from 2019 
to 2028.2 With this significant increase in government funding going to
healthcare, the unavoidable result of potential healthcare fraud is a
pressing issue; thus, the need for the False Claims Act (“FCA” or “the 
Act”) has never been higher. In fiscal year 2019 alone, the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) obtained more than $3 billion in settlements and
judgments from civil cases involving fraud and false claims against the
government.3 With the rapidly increasing amount of government funds
funneled into healthcare, the FCA serves as an effective combatant to
fraud while also protecting government contractors. 
Claims filed under the FCA must meet the pleading requirements of
both Rule 8(a) and Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 
However, courts are divided on the proper application of Rule 9(b) to a
relator’s qui tam5 action.6 The central issue is whether relators must plead 
Copyright 2021, by P. CULLEN MCDONALD.
 J.D. candidate 2022. Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
1. CMS: US health care spending will reach $4T in 2020, ADVISORY BOARD




3. Justice Department Recovers over $3 Billion from False Claims Act Cases
in Fiscal Year 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov
/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-ye
ar-2019 [https://perma.cc/6MGH-2YKV] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
4. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707
F.3d 451, 455–56 (4th Cir. 2013).
5. Qui tam is an abbreviation of qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso
in hac parte sequitur, meaning “who as well for the king as for himself sues in
this matter.” This is an action brought under a statute that allows a private person
to sue for a penalty. Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
6. A relator is an informer or someone who furnishes information on which
a civil or criminal case is based. Relator, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019).
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specific bills7 submitted to the government in their complaint.8 On the one 
hand, the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh circuits have
interpreted the phrase “with particularity” in Rule 9(b) to foreclose an
action if a plaintiff, at the pleading stage, does not allege particulars of a
specific false claim submitted to the government.9 This approach is
commonly referred to as the representative-sample approach,10 and courts 
opting for this approach typically require relators to identify specific false
claims submitted to the government by describing the time, place, actors,
and contents of the allegedly fraudulent claims.11 
On the other hand, the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth circuits 
have opted for a more lenient application of Rule 9(b).12 These circuits 
have stated that a relator satisfies the requirements of Rule 9(b) by alleging
details of a fraudulent scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable
indicia13 that lead to a strong inference that false claims were actually
7. A bill is a specific claim for payment submitted to the government, even
if the government did not pay the bill. Liability under the FCA attaches to a claim
for payment submitted and does not hinge on whether the government paid it. See 
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2).
8. Id.; see also id. §§ 3730–3733.
9. See United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d
220 (1st Cir. 2004); Takeda, 707 F.3d 451; United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty.
Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2007); United States ex rel. Joshi v. St.
Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2006); United States ex rel. Clausen v.
Lab’y Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2002).
10. See Clausen, 290 F.3d 1301.
11. United States ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153,
155–56 (3d Cir. 2014).
12. See Foglia, 754 F.3d 153; United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti,
565 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp.,
570 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2009); Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d
993 (9th Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc.,
614 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010).
13. Under the reliable-indicia standard, courts have found reliable indicia 
when the relator sets forth (1) statistical proof, (2) direct personal knowledge of
the fraud, or (3) direct personal knowledge about the billing process. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Nargol v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 865 F.3d 29, 41 (1st
Cir. 2017) (finding that the relators had fit into the “more flexible” approach used
when evaluating the sufficiency of fraud pleadings in connection with indirect
false claims for government payment and demonstrated “reliable indicia that lead
to a strong inference that claims were actually submitted” when the “[r]elators
allege[d] that, over a five-year period, several thousand Medicare and Medicaid
recipients received what their doctors understood to be Pinnacle MoM device
implants; that more than half of those implants fell outside the specifications
approved by the FDA; and that the latency of the defect was such that doctors
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  366 11/19/21  12:02 PM




   
  
   









      
  




   
    
  
          
    
  
 
   




     
     
   
   
      
       
       
   
         
  
        
    
 
362 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
submitted to the government, even if the relator does not identify a specific
false claim.14 The Supreme Court’s heightened plausibility standard for
satisfying Rule 8(a), announced in the landmark Twombly15 and Iqbal16 
decisions, creates more uncertainty in qui tam actions. Since the Supreme
Court decided these cases, lower courts have struggled to reconcile the
plausibility pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) with the particularity
requirements of Rule 9(b) in FCA complaints.17 Most recently, in 2020,
the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari to resolve this issue.
At the pleading stage, most civil complaints must comply only with
Rule 8(a).18 Under Rule 8(a), plaintiffs are required to state their claims in
“short and plain statement[s] showing that [they] are entitled to relief.”19 
Because FCA violations are “fraud-like,” courts have universally held that
FCA complaints are subject to the requirements of Rule 9(b) as well as
Rule 8(a).20 The courts’ interpretations of the differing standards of Rules
8(a) and 9(b) have created a circuit split on what exactly a relator is
required to plead in an FCA complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss
for failure to plead with particularity.21 In order to resolve the circuit split
would have had no reason not to submit claims for reimbursement for
noncompliant devices” and where the complaint essentially alleged facts showing
that it is statistically certain that the defendant caused third parties to submit many
false claims to the government); see also United States ex rel. Chorches v. Am.
Med. Response, Inc., 865 F.3d 71, 84–85, 93 (2d Cir. 2017) (“in alleging that
supervisors specifically referenced Medicare as the provider to whose 
requirements the allegedly falsified revisions were intended to conform, the
[complaint] supports a strong inference that false claims were submitted to the
government”); see also United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the
Heartland, 765 F.3d 914, 917–20 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding that “a relator who
provides sufficient indicia of reliability to support her allegations that false claims
were submitted, such as by pleading details about defendant’s billing practices 
and pleading personal knowledge of the defendant’s billing practices fulfills Rule
9(b)’s objective . . . .”).
14. See generally Foglia, 754 F.3d 153; Grubbs, 565 F.3d 180; Lusby, 570
F.3d 849; Ebeid, 616 F.3d 993; Lemmon, 614 F.3d 1163.
15. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
16. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
17. See discussion infra Section V.D.
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720 (1st Cir.
2007).
21. See United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180 (5th Cir.
2009) (holding that a relator pleads with particularity by pleading details of a
scheme with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that false claims were
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  367 11/19/21  12:02 PM







   
  
   




   
  
     
  
   
 




   
     
   
 
     
 
      
 
       
       
       




    
     
      
    
    





on the precise meaning of “pleading with particularity” in an FCA action, 
the Supreme Court should grant certiorari and apply Rule 9(b)’s
particularity requirements strictly to the first two elements of an FCA
action, that is, (1) that there was a claim for a federal fund and (2) that the
claim was false. To satisfy these elements, the relators should be required
to plead specific bills that were submitted to the government. The third
element, the defendant’s knowledge of the claim’s falsity, should only be
required to satisfy the plausibility standard of Rule 8(a).22 
Liability under the FCA derives from the claim for payment, not the
underlying fraudulent scheme,23 and courts have held that the claim is the 
sine qua non of an FCA violation.24 As a result, the circuits that allow a
relator to proceed to discovery by merely including details of an alleged
fraudulent scheme in the relator’s complaint have done so incorrectly.25 
Similarly, courts stating that a relator’s allegation of a specific false claim
alone is sufficient to satisfy Rule 9(b) have failed to consider that without
a fraudulent scheme, there is nothing to prove that the claim was false.26 
Requiring courts to apply different pleading standards to the different
elements of an FCA violation serves the purpose of Rule 9(b) and fits well
within the Act’s unique structure.27 A relator may sufficiently plead a 
defendant’s scheme under Rule 8(a)’s plausibility standard; but if the
scheme did not yield any claims submitted to the government, then the
defendant is not liable under the FCA.28 A relator may also identify
specific false claims for payment, yet without any underlying fraudulent
scheme, these bills would be interpreted as nothing more than raw
numbers.29 Therefore, requiring specific, fraudulent bills in the complaint
submitted); see also United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d
1301 (11th Cir. 2002).
22. See discussion infra Section V.B.
23. United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 765
F.3d 914, 916 (8th Cir. 2014); see also United States ex rel. Longhi v. United
States, 575 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap
Physician Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1002 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The False Claims Act . . .
focuses on the submission of a claim, and does not concern itself with whether or
to what extent there exists a menacing underlying scheme.”).
24. Hopper v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 2009).
25. See infra Section III.B.
26. See infra Section III.A.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
29. See United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th
Cir. 2009) (“Standing alone, raw bills—even with numbers, dates, and amounts— 
are not fraud without an underlying scheme to submit the bills for unperformed
or unnecessary work.”).
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  368 11/19/21  12:02 PM




   
  
   
    
   
  
 
   
 
  
   
   
  
  
   
 
   
  
    
 





     
 
   
  
     
  
   
 
     
    
     
    
     
    
 
   
364 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
is the correct application of Rule 9(b) to a violation of the FCA’s first two
elements.30 Holding the details of the defendant’s fraudulent scheme—the
third element—to the Rule 8(a) plausibility standard will best serve the
functions of the FCA to uncover fraud against the U.S. government.31 This 
standard takes into consideration the expanded information sharing
between the DOJ and a relator, and places emphasis on what is truly
necessary to constitute an FCA violation.32 
Part I of this Comment will provide background of the FCA and 
explain the structure of an FCA lawsuit. Part II will discuss the pleading
requirements under the FCA and Rules 8(a) and 9(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Part III will present the cases that illustrate the current
circuit split regarding the proper pleading requirements for qui tam actions
brought under the FCA. This Part will also break down why the federal
courts’ current approaches fail to adequately consider the use of civil
investigative demands33 and the complexity of an FCA lawsuit in general.
Part IV will then argue that although circuits opting for a relaxed 
application of Rule 9(b) seem to be doing so to combat fraud, the
uniqueness of the FCA is best served with a strict application of Rule
9(b)—one that requires the relator to identify a specific claim for
payment—in conjunction with Rule 8(a)’s plausibility standard. Part V
will propose that a blind application of Rule 9(b) to all three elements of
an FCA violation is incorrect and that the only way to achieve the FCA’s
stated purpose, in conjunction with the government’s mandatory
investigation, is to properly separate each FCA claim into three elements
and apply a different pleading standard to each element. 
I. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: HISTORY AND CURRENT USE
Initially created to prevent fraudsters from overcharging Union troops,
the FCA has evolved into one of the government’s most effective tools to 
combat fraud against the United States.34 Amendments to the FCA have
placed the government in a more prevalent role in the fight against fraud.
The Department of Justice is required to investigate every FCA complaint
and then share that information with the relator who filed suit.35 This
30. See infra Section IV.A.
31. Infra Part V.
32. See infra Section V.B.
33. See 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (2018).
34. See James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for
150 Years for Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV.
1261, 1267 (2013).
35. 31 U.S.C. § 3733.
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3652021] COMMENT
unique framework is designed to enlist the help of private individuals to
sue defendants, yet the current use of the Act could negatively affect
defendants’ reputations and turn the FCA into a method of recovery for 
relators that Congress did not intend.36 
A. Current Function 
The FCA is currently the government’s “primary litigation tool” for
recovering losses resulting from fraud,37 allowing a relator to file suit
against a defendant that is defrauding the government.38 The relator files
suit under seal and delivers a copy to the DOJ along with a written 
disclosure detailing the evidence and information contained in the
complaint.39 While the suit is under seal, the Act requires the DOJ to 
diligently investigate the allegations contained in the complaint.40 During
this time, the DOJ performs its investigation and ultimately decides
whether it wants to intervene or allow the relator to continue prosecuting
the alleged fraud on his or her own.41 
The Act imposes civil and criminal penalties on persons who
knowingly present false or fraudulent monetary claims to the federal
government or who knowingly use a false record to avoid or decrease a 
monetary obligation to pay the government.42 In the FCA, there are seven
specific provisions that identify what constitutes a violation.43 
Specifically, the FCA imposes civil penalties and treble damages on any
person who, inter alia, “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”44 
The statute attaches liability not to the underlying fraudulent activity or to
the government’s wrongful payment, but to the claim for payment.45 
Therefore, the central question in FCA cases is whether the defendant ever
presented a “false or fraudulent claim” to the government.46 
36. See infra Section I.A.
37. United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 267
(5th Cir. 2010).
38. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3730.
39. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
40. Id. § 3730(a).
41. See generally id.
42. Id. §§ 3729–3733.
43. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G).
44. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(B).
45. See generally id. § 3729.
46. See id. § 3729(a)(1)(A).
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366 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
While there are seven different ways a defendant can violate the
FCA,47 each violation consists of the same central elements: (1) there was
a claim for a federal fund; (2) the claim was false; and (3) the defendant
knew of its falsity.48 Thus, a person does not violate the FCA by simply
submitting a false claim to the government: the defendant must have
submitted, or caused the submission of, the false claim with knowledge of
its falsity.49 The FCA defines knowledge as “actual knowledge,”
“deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information,” or
“reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.”50 
Interestingly, the FCA does not require proof of specific intent to
defraud.51 
The Act also reaches far beyond presentment claims and fraud.52 In
fact, “Congress wrote expansively, meaning to reach all types of fraud,
47. A person may violate the Act in seven ways. If a person
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent
claim for payment or approval; (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to
be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or
fraudulent claim; (3) conspires to commit a violation of [any of the other
six methods]; (4) has possession, custody, or control of property or
money used; (5) is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying
receipt of property used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending
to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without
completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true; 
(6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt,
public property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a
member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge
property; or (7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a
false record or statement material to an obligation to pay money or
property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and
improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money
or property to the Government, that person is liable.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G); see also Charis A. Mitchell, A Fraudulent
Scheme’s Particularity Under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
4 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 337, 346 (2015).
48. See Mitchell, supra note 47, at 367; see also United States ex rel.
Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physician Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
United States ex rel. Oliver v. Parsons Co., 195 F.3d 457, 461 (9th Cir. 1999)).
49. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A PRIMER (2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_
FCA_Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW53-2B3G].
50. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1).
51. See id.
52. See Michael Lockman, In Defense of a Strict Pleading Standard for False 
Claims Act Whistleblowers, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1559, 1562 (2015). “Presentment”
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3672021] COMMENT
without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the
government.”53 Because the FCA is essentially an anti-fraud statute, a
complaint’s false claim allegations must comply with the rule requiring a
party to state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud; in
addition, the complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that,
when accepted as true, state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.54 
B. History of The False Claims Act
Congress first enacted the FCA in 1863 due to concerns that suppliers
of goods to the Union Army were defrauding the government.55 The fraud 
was so pervasive that the government could not stop it on its own,56 and 
the solution to this problem was to enlist the help of private individuals to
prosecute fraud of which the government was unaware.57 Because the
fraud occurring during the Civil War resulted largely from collusion
between civilian or government officials and government contractors, the
United States implemented a qui tam provision in the Act. The qui tam
provision allows a person—referred to as a “relator”—to bring a civil
action on behalf of themselves and the government to uncover fraud with
a chance to share in the penalty recovered in court.58 The Act was sparingly
invoked from its enactment in the 1860s until the 1940s.59 During the
1940s, relators began filing qui tam actions using publicly available
information found in criminal indictments.60 After the government
successfully prosecuted criminal fraud cases against defendants, private
attorneys would subsequently file FCA civil actions against the same
defendants, alleging the exact behavior the government had just proven.61 
The attorneys would win the civil suits, since the government had already
proven the existence of fraudulent behavior, and take a percentage of the
refers to a situation where a defendant presents or submits a false claim to the
government. 
53. Cook Cnty., Ill. v. United States, 538 U.S. 119, 129 (2003).
54. See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
55. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 49.
56. See Ryan T. Andrews, The Plausibility Standard and the False Claims
Act: Protecting Fraudsters by Preventing Private Enforcement, 22 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 1283, 1286 (2015).
57. Dingle v. Bioport Corp., 388 F.3d 209, 215 (6th Cir. 2004).
58. See § 3730(b), (d) (2018).
59. See Anna Mae Walsh Burke, Qui Tam: Blowing the Whistle for Uncle
Sam, 21 NOVA L. REV. 869, 872 (1997).
60. Id.
61. See Helmer, supra note 34, at 1267–68.
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368 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
recovery without ever actually having to uncover fraud of which the
government was unaware.62 These parasitic lawsuits were exacerbated in
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess in 1943.63 
In Marcus, the relators used a criminal indictment charged against the
defendants to file a claim for an FCA violation.64 The relators’ complaints 
offered no information other than the facts from the criminal indictment,
of which the government was already aware.65 Nonetheless, the Court held
that the language of the FCA meant that “[s]uits may be brought and
carried on by any person . . . . Although the relator has contributed nothing
to the discovery of this crime, he contributed much to accomplishing one
of the purposes for which the [A]ct was passed.”66 In this case, the qui tam
provision appeared to work exactly as Congress intended: the relators
brought the civil action and obtained a net recovery for the United States
in the amount of $150,000, three times the amount of fines the Department
of Justice recovered in the criminal case.67 
This ruling led the legislature to amend the FCA in 1943, requiring 
relators to submit evidence of their claims to the government and
prohibiting relators from using information that was previously known to 
the government in their complaint.68 These amendments, seeking to end
the parasitic lawsuits like the one in Marcus, practically eliminated all qui
tam actions.69 Under the new government-knowledge bar, qui tam cases
were nearly impossible to bring since someone somewhere in the
government would almost always have knowledge of the fraud.70 Other 
1943 amendments to the FCA required relators to provide the government
with all evidence in their possession at the time the complaint was filed
and to give the government 60 days to intervene in the action.71 The
amended FCA also provided that the relator’s share of the profits from the
action could be between 10% and 25%, depending on whether the
government elected to intervene.72 Though these amendments were
included in an attempt to end parasitic lawsuits and promote relator
62. Id. 
63. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 545.
67. Helmer, supra note 34, at 1268.
68. Act of December 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3730).
69. Helmer, supra note 34, at 1270.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1270–71.
72. Id.
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3692021] COMMENT
recovery for uncovering previously unknown fraud, the government-
knowledge bar made it almost impossible for a relator to bring an FCA
claim.73 
The FCA remained largely unchanged from 1943 until 1986. In 1986,
Congress amended the FCA again, this time strengthening the qui tam
provisions of the Act.74 The U.S. government spent a significant amount
of money on national defense during the Cold War against the Soviet
Union, and the large number of government contracts made it easier for
contractors to defraud the government.75 These amendments removed the 
government-knowledge bar implemented in 1943 and replaced it with a 
more limited public-disclosure bar, which prevented anyone other than the
government from intervening or bringing a related action based on the
facts underlying the pending action.76 Additionally, the 1986 amendments 
increased relator awards, permitted relators to continue in a suit if the
government chose not to intervene, removed the specific-intent
requirement for proving fraud, and increased statutory penalties from
$2,000 to a range of $5,000–$10,000.77 The 1986 amendments were
enacted not only to encourage whistleblowers, but also to act “as a check
that the government does not neglect evidence, cause undu[e] delay, or
drop the False Claims case without legitimate reason.”78 
Following Congress’s amendments in 1986, pursuing a claim under
the FCA was extremely attractive, and the government began recovering 
more money from false claims than ever before.79 However, utilization of
the FCA came to a halt again in 2008 after the Supreme Court decided
Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, where the Court
narrowly interpreted the FCA and required a plaintiff to show that the
defendant intended to defraud the U.S. government specifically, rather
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1271.
76. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). The public-disclosure bar prevents anyone
other than the government from intervening or bringing a related action based on
the facts underlying the pending action. This provision bars any qui tam case that 
is based on a prior public disclosure of the allegations by the media or a criminal,
civil, or administrative hearing unless the relator is an “original source” with
direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are 
based and who voluntarily provided such information to the government before
filing suit.
77. See id. § 3729.
78. See Helmer, supra note 34, at 1275.
79. Andrews, supra note 56, at 1296 (noting that the government recovered
$38.9 billion from FCA suits between 1986 and 2013).
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370 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
than a main contractor.80 Congress believed that the Supreme Court’s
holding protected defendants in FCA claims—contrary to the Act’s 
purpose of uncovering fraud against the government—and responded
legislatively, effectively overruling Allison Engine and breathing new life
into the FCA.81 
Specifically, Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act
of 2009 (“FERA”), expanding the utilization of FCA claims.82 These
amendments provide the DOJ with expanded tools to conduct civil
investigations into fraud and more freedom to share information obtained
using civil investigative demands with the relator. This means that relators
who lack specific knowledge of violations can avoid a motion to dismiss
by supplementing their complaints with information obtained during a
government investigation.83 
Congress once again amended the FCA in 2010 through the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).84 The ACA included an
exception to the public-disclosure bar for relators who were original
sources and also created liability under the FCA for contractors who retain
overpayments made by the government or offer kickbacks to receive 
government funds.85 The FERA and ACA amendments to the FCA
highlight the government’s reliance on the FCA as a tool to combat fraud.
C. Structure of an FCA Lawsuit
The procedural framework governing the FCA is unique. When a
relator files suit, the suit must be filed under seal for an initial period of 60
days.86 During this initial 60-day period, the DOJ is required to investigate
the relator’s claims and determine whether it wants to intervene in the
suit.87 Courts have the authority to grant extensions, at the government’s 
80. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672– 
73 (2008).
81. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 
§ 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621 (2009).
82. Stephen Sozio & Rachael A. Ream, Amendments to the False Claims Act




83. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. 
84. Helmer, supra note 34, at 1279.
85. Andrews, supra note 56, at 1291.
86. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
87. Id.
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3712021] COMMENT
request, beyond the initial 60-day period, so the DOJ can continue its
investigation.88 The extensions are typically granted, and most FCA
complaints are under seal for an average of 13 months.89 
During the investigation, the Attorney General may delegate the
power to issue Civil Investigative Demands (“CIDs”) to the Assistant
Attorney General for the Civil Division.90 CIDs include the power to
demand production of documents, oral testimony, and answers to
interrogatories.91 In addition to CIDs, the FERA amendments give the DOJ 
freedom to share information obtained through the CIDs with the relator
who initially filed suit.92 This allows the relator to benefit from months, or
even years, of investigations and then supplement his or her original
complaint with information gathered through investigations, interviews,
subpoenas, and discussions with defense counsel.93 Once the relator adds 
this information to the complaint, courts evaluate the qui tam complaint
under the strictures of Rules 8(a) and 9(b).94 
II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS: RULE 8(A) AND RULE 9(B)
All civil actions filed in federal courts are subject to the pleading 
requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.95
Actions that are based in fraud are also required to meet the pleading
requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.96 Thus,
qui tam actions under the FCA are subject to both Rule 8(a) and Rule 9(b).
88. Id. § 3730(b)(3).
89. See Gregory J. Brod, Qui Tam Cases Remain Under Seal for Years, 
HEALTHCARE FRAUD LAW. BLOG (2017), https://www.healthcare-fraud-lawyer
.com/qui-tam-cases-remain-seal-years/ [https://perma.cc/G7NW-9WZG]. 
90. Sozio & Ream, supra note 82.
91. See 31 U.S.C. § 3733; see also Lockman, supra note 52, at 1584, 1586:
CIDs are a type of nonreciprocal, one-sided discovery that can continue
for years and can cost FCA targets millions in CID compliance costs. . . . 
[W]hile the DOJ may investigate and obtain expansive access to an FCA
defendant, the defendant has no reciprocal ability to respond with its own
discovery requests.
92. Sozio & Ream, supra note 82.
93. See Lockman, supra note 52, at 1565.
94. See United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 185–86 
(5th Cir. 2009) (“Rule 9(b) supplements but does not supplant Rule 8(a)’s notice
pleading.”).
95. Infra Section II.A.
96. Infra Section II.B.
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372 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
A. Rule 8(a)
Under Rule 8(a), a plaintiff must state his or her claims in short and
plain statements showing that he or she is entitled to relief.97 This style of
pleading is referred to as “notice pleading.”98 The idea behind notice
pleading is not to keep litigants out of court, but rather to keep them in
court.99 Rule 8(a) abandoned the rigid regime of code pleading that
required plaintiffs to plead the facts of their case in detail using only a
predetermined set of form allegations.100 Prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Twombly, the Court evaluated Rule 8(a) under the “no set of
facts” standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson.101 Under this standard, claims
were not to be dismissed pre-discovery “unless it appear[ed] beyond doubt
that the plaintiff c[ould] prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.”102 The Court reasoned that defendants would
be able to apprise themselves of the nature of plaintiffs’ claims from the
complaint, and then both parties could determine specific facts of the case
through liberal opportunity for discovery.103 
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Twombly, effectively overruling
the Conley standard that had been in effect for 50 years.104 In Twombly, 
the Court held that a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that, 
if the facts are accepted as true, the complaint “state[s] a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.”105 The plaintiffs in Twombly alleged antitrust
violations.106 In considering the high costs of antitrust discovery, the Court
stated that complying with discovery created a significant cost to
defendants and, therefore, a significant incentive for them to settle
otherwise meritless claims in order to avoid that cost.107 The Court
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
98. Notice pleading is a procedural system that requires the pleader to give 
only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, and not a complete detailing of all facts. Notice Pleading, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
99. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
100. See William M. Richman et al., The Pleading of Fraud: Rhymes Without 
Reason, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 970–71 (1987).
101. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S.
544.
102. Id. at 45–46.
103. Id. at 46–48.
104. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
105. Id. at 545.
106. Id. at 548.
107. Id. at 559.
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3732021] COMMENT
concluded that trial judges must use motions to dismiss to prevent
discovery abuse by dismissing complaints that allege only possible 
liability, but not plausible liability.108 
Two years after Twombly, the Court decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a case
involving U.S. government discrimination against Arab Muslims.109 
Citing Twombly, the Court held that the plaintiff’s complaint was
insufficient.110 Additionally, the Court held that Twombly’s plausibility
standard extends to all federal civil claims.111 As a result, all civil actions, 
including FCA complaints, must comply with Rule 8(a)’s plausibility
requirement.112 Accordingly, courts must ignore anything they perceive as
a legal conclusion in the complaint and then analyze the remaining
allegations to determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for
relief.113 If the plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege a plausible claim for
relief, then the court will dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim.114 
B. Rule 9(b)
In addition to Rule 8(a)’s plausibility requirements, complaints
alleging fraud are subject to the heightened particularity standard of Rule
9(b).115 Rule 9(b) requires that all complaints alleging fraud state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.116 Courts are aware that
mere allegations of fraud can do harm and “bite defendants without
apology”;117 therefore, claims for fraud must include facts as to the time, 
place, and substance of the alleged fraud.118 The application of Rule 9(b)
seeks to serve four main purposes: (1) to provide fair notice to allow the
defendant to prepare a defense; (2) to deter frivolous or strike suits; (3) to
prevent fishing expeditions where all wrongful conduct is learned in
108. Id. at 570.
109. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
110. Id. at 680.
111. Id. at 684.
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 678–83.
114. See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
116. Id.
117. United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir.
2009).
118. Id. at 185–186; see also Andrews, supra note 56, at 1293.
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374 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
discovery; and (4) to prevent harm to the goodwill and reputation of the
defendant.119 
Because fraud is historically a disfavored action,120 pleadings alleging 
fraud require greater particularity.121 A complaint that fails to comply with 
Rule 9(b) is subject to dismissal, typically without prejudice, which
enables the plaintiff to amend the complaint to attempt to supply the
missing information.122 In addition, because fraud covers a potentially
wide range of conduct, Rule 9(b) ensures that the defendant has enough
particular information to respond.123 Rule 9(b) also prohibits plaintiffs
from using discovery to ascertain whether fraud exists or “unilaterally 
imposing upon the court, the parties, and society enormous social and
economic costs absent some factual basis.”124 In general, the rule requires
that the plaintiff explain who was involved, where and when the fraud took
place, and the nature of the fraud in their complaint.125 
The second sentence of Rule 9(b) exempts allegations relating to a
defendant’s knowledge or intent from the heightened pleading
requirements when alleging fraud or mistake.126 This sentence 
complements the language of the FCA, where no specific intent to defraud
is required.127 In writing for the majority in Iqbal, Justice Kennedy stated
that the second sentence of Rule 9(b) should be read to mean that
allegations of malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of the mind 
must be plead consistently with the plausibility pleading standard of Rule
119. Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190.
120. Jeff Sovern, Reconsidering Federal Civil Rule 9(b): Do We Need
Particularized Pleading Requirements in Fraud Cases?, 104 F.R.D. 143, 144–45 
(1985).
121. Id.
122. See Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996)).
123. CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1296 (West 3d ed. 2004).
124. Bly-Magee, 236 F.3d at 1018.
125. See generally United States ex rel. Doe v. Dow Chemical Co., 343 F.3d
325 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that the complaint must set forth the “time, place and
contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making
the misrepresentation and what [that person] obtained thereby”); see also United
States ex rel. Costner v. United States, 317 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating
that the complaint must identify the “who, what, where, when, and how” of the
alleged fraud).
126. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge and other conditions of
the mind may be averred generally.”).
127. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B).
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3752021] COMMENT
8(a).128 Justice Kennedy declared that in pleading knowledge under Rule
9(b), one must apply the “still-operative strictures of Rule 8.”129 The 
strictures of Rule 8 require well-pleaded factual allegations that show
plausible entitlement to relief.130 Accordingly, complaints filed under the 
FCA must meet both Rule 8(a) and Rule 9(b)’s requirements.
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE CLAIM OR THE SCHEME?
Federal courts are divided on the correct application of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to relators’ claims under the FCA.131 This circuit
split stems in large part from the failure to apply the correct pleading
standard to the correct element of a relator’s claim.132 Courts that have
adopted a strict standard—one that requires that a relator allege a specific
false claim for payment in the pleading—have correctly focused on what
creates liability under the Act.133 However, a relator must still plead details 
of a defendant’s fraudulent scheme to satisfy the “conditions of the mind”
clause of Rule 9(b). As Justice Kennedy stated in Iqbal, this clause
essentially requires plausibility.134 
The First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh circuits have all held
that a relator must plead a representative sample of the defendant’s fraud
to satisfy the strictures of Rule 9(b).135 Conversely, the Third, Fifth, 
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth circuits have stated that a relator satisfies the 
particularity requirement so long as the relator pleads details of a
defendant’s fraudulent scheme paired with reliable indicia that lead to a
reasonable inference that the relator actually submitted false claims.136 
A. Strict Application
Courts have consistently held that relators must plead with 
particularity under Rule 9(b) for FCA claims.137 Certain circuits have 
128. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686–87 (2009).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 678–79.
131. Compare United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180 (5th
Cir. 2009), with United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d
1301 (11th Cir. 2002).
132. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
133. Id.
134. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662.
135. See infra Section III.A.
136. See infra Section III.B.
137. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720 (1st Cir.
2007).
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376 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
required a relator to identify in the complaint a specific false claim
submitted to the government, which is referred to as the representative-
sample approach.138 One of the most notable cases of the representative-
sample approach is United States ex rel. Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of
America, Inc.139 In Clausen, the relator filed a complaint naming a 
competitor of the relator’s employer as the defendant and alleging over a
decade of fraudulent billing practices.140 The court granted the relator
leave to amend twice, and the relator eventually provided detailed
information about conversations with employees, descriptions and codes
for medical tests that represented the false claims, and patient histories for
three patients.141 Additionally, the relator identified the day the defendant
rendered the service, a table of medical test codes, and descriptions of how
the defendant would identify the testing.142 The Eleventh Circuit
ultimately dismissed the complaint, stating that “[i]f Rule 9(b) is to be
adhered to, some indicia of reliability must be given in the complaint to 
support the allegation of an actual false claim for payment being made to
the Government.”143 Focusing on the relator’s status as a corporate
outsider,144 the court held that the relator’s complaint demonstrated no
indicia of reliability and therefore must fail since the relator did not plead
any individual false claims.145 
The First Circuit similarly held a relator to the strict particularity
standard of Rule 9(b) in United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-
Wakefield Hospital.146 In Karvelas, the relator made detailed allegations 
about numerous fraudulent schemes the defendants committed against the
government, described the billing of 12 respiratory therapists when the
hospital only employed 7, alleged that the hospital did not use appropriate
testing machinery, and alleged that the defendants filed improper
138. See United States v. St Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 557 (8th Cir.
2006).
139. United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301 (11th
Cir. 2002).
140. Id. at 1303.
141. Id. at 1315.
142. Id. at 1306.
143. Id. at 1311 (emphasis added).
144. The term “corporate outsider” as used in FCA cases simply implies that 
the relator is not privy to the defendant’s billing practices or accounting
information. See infra Section IV.C.
145. Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1315.
146. United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220
(1st Cir. 2004).
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3772021] COMMENT
claims.147 The district court dismissed the relator’s complaint due to the
relator’s failure to identify a specific invoice, bill, or claim for payment, 
and the First Circuit affirmed.148 Notably, the First Circuit stated that
though the relator had alleged 16 fraudulent schemes in the 93-page 
complaint, the relator’s claim failed to plead with particularity because it
failed to identify the defendants’ presentation of a specific false or
fraudulent claim to the government.149 
The Sixth Circuit followed the Eleventh Circuit’s representative-
sample approach from Clausen in deciding United States ex rel. Bledsoe 
v. Community Health System.150 In Bledsoe, the court held that to comply
with Rule 9(b), an FCA complaint must identify with particularity one or
more specific false claims rather than a scheme for submitting false
claims.151 The Fourth Circuit also requires representative samples when “a
defendant’s actions, as alleged and as reasonably inferred from the
allegations, could have led, but need not necessarily have led, to the
submission of false claims.”152 For example, in United States ex rel. 
Nathan v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals North America, Inc., a relator alleged 
that a doctor wrote almost 100 prescriptions for the drug in question yet
failed to allege that the prescriptions were written for off-label uses.153 The 
relator also failed to allege that patients ever filled the prescriptions.154 The 
court declined to relax the Rule 9(b) particularity standard, determining 
that the allegations were not pled with particularity because the relator did
not identify any claims that would trigger liability under the FCA.155 
Perhaps the most inconsistent circuit for FCA claims is the Eighth
Circuit.156 In United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., the relator
was an anesthesiologist who worked for the defendant hospital for seven
years.157 The relator alleged that the defendant received reimbursements
147. Id. at 234.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 241.
150. United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 492
(6th Cir. 2007).
151. See id. at 510.
152. United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451
(4th Cir. 2013).
153. Id. at 459–60.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. See United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552 (8th
Cir. 2006); see also United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the
Heartland, 765 F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2014).
157. Joshi, 441 F.3d 552.
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378 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
from Medicare for services a doctor performed when a doctor did not
perform the services.158 In an amended complaint, the relator included a
table identifying the anesthesia services provided, the time, the surgeon,
the patient’s initials, the CRNA who provided the services, and a table
listing medications issued to patients and improperly billed in 1995.159 
Despite the descriptions of specific instances of false billing in the relator’s 
complaint, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the complaint for failure to plead
with sufficient particularity.160 While at first glance it appeared that the 
relator satisfied the “who, what, when, and where” requirements of fraud,
the relator failed to plead with particularity because the complaint did not
identify a specific claim for payment.161 
In a more recent Eighth Circuit case, the relators in United States ex
rel. Strubbe v. Crawford County Memorial Hospital alleged that the
hospital violated the FCA by submitting, among other things, false claims
for breathing treatments, false claims documenting those breathing 
treatments, and reimbursement requests for improper payments for
expenses.162 The court acknowledged that the relator pled details of a 
fraudulent scheme yet held that the complaint failed to allege
representative examples of the required specificity.163 The court noted that
the complaint contained an example of a patient who received an
unnecessary breathing treatment, but the complaint failed to include the
date, the provider performing the treatment, any specific information
about the patient, and most importantly, whether a claim was actually
submitted for that particular patient.164 
The Eighth Circuit’s strict application in both Joshi and Strubbe is 
inconsistent with its decision in United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned
Parenthood of the Heartland.165 The relator in Thayer brought a qui tam
action against Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, alleging that Planned
Parenthood submitted false or fraudulent claims for Medicare
reimbursement.166 Specifically, the relator alleged that Planned
158. Id. at 553.
159. Id. at 555.
160. Id. at 556.
161. See id. (quoting United States ex rel. Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc.,
317 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2001)).
162. United States ex rel. Strubbe v. Crawford Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 915 F.3d
1158, 1162 (8th Cir. 2019).
163. Id. at 1164.
164. Id.
165. United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 765
F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2014).
166. Id. at 915.
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Parenthood filed claims for unnecessary quantities of birth control pills,
sought reimbursement for abortion-related services, filed claims for the
full amount of services that had already been paid in whole or in part by
donations, and filed claims for more expensive services than were actually 
performed.167 Missing from the relator’s complaint was a specific,
representative sample of the defendant’s fraudulent practices.168 However,
because the relator was the center manager of a Planned Parenthood clinic
who had access to the defendant’s billing and claims systems, the Eighth
Circuit reasoned that a relator could satisfy Rule 9(b) by providing details
of a fraudulent scheme paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong
inference that false claims were submitted.169 
A strict application of Rule 9(b) does not thwart the purpose of the
FCA.170 In fact, requiring a relator to identify a specific claim for payment
is more effective than allowing a relator to proceed to discovery without
alleging anything that would create liability under the Act, since there can
be no liability without a claim for payment submitted.171 Courts favoring 
the representative-sample approach have correctly identified the critical,
liability-creating element on which FCA claims turn: that the defendant
submitted a specific claim for payment to the government.172 However, the 
submission of a claim, in and of itself, is not sufficient for an FCA
violation.173 Additionally, these circuits have not always been consistent
with the requirement of a representative sample of a false claim, as
evidenced in Thayer.174 
Proponents of the relaxed Rule 9(b) standard argue that alleging
details of the scheme paired with reliable indicia will ensure that relators
167. Id. at 915–16.
168. Id. at 917.
169. Id.
170. See infra Section IV.A.
171. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
172. See United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301
(11th Cir. 2002); United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360
F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 2004); United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc.,
501 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2007); United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N.
Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013); United States ex rel. Strubbe v. Crawford
Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 915 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. 2019).
173. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (“knowingly presents, or causes to be
submitted, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”).
174. See generally Thayer, 765 F.3d 914 (placing an emphasis on the relator’s
status as a regional manager for the defendant’s company increasing the reliability
of the complaint, rather than requiring the relator to identify a specific false
claim).
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380 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
can recover against the defendants.175 However, the purpose of the qui tam
provision is to allow the government to enlist the assistance of private
individuals to prosecute fraud against the government, leading to the
recovery of money that the defendant essentially stole from the
government.176 For this to happen, a relator’s complaint, incorporating
information from the government’s use of CIDs, must identify a specific
claim for payment.177 The representative-sample approach has gotten one 
part of the analysis right: requiring a relator to identify a specific claim for
payment. Circuits opting in favor of a lenient Rule 9(b) standard have done
so incorrectly by allowing details of a fraudulent scheme to satisfy Rule 
9(b)’s particularity requirements.178 
B. Lenient Approach
Courts opting for a more lenient standard when applying Rule 9(b)
have held that a complaint satisfies Rule 9(b) when it includes particular
details of a defendant’s fraudulent scheme paired with reliable indicia that
lead to a strong inference that the defendant actually submitted false 
claims.179 These circuits do not emphasize a specific claim for payment,
but rather focus on the underlying scheme.180 While the scheme is a 
necessary element to prove a defendant’s knowledge of the claim’s falsity,
details of a fraudulent scheme paired with reliable indicia cannot satisfy
the Rule 9(b) particularity standard for FCA violations when there is no
specific claim for payment identified.181 
The Fifth Circuit in United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti held 
that a relator satisfies Rule 9(b) by alleging particular details of a scheme
to submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong
inference that false claims were actually submitted.182 The relator in
175. See generally United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180
(5th Cir. 2009).
176. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G).
177. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (“knowingly presents, or causes to be
submitted, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”).
178. See infra Section V.A.
179. See generally Grubbs, 565 F.3d 180; United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-
Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Lemmon v.
Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010); Ebeid ex rel. United
States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2010); Foglia v. Renal Ventures
Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2014).
180. See cases cited supra note 179. 
181. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (“knowingly present[ed], or cause[d] to be
presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”).
182. Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190.
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3812021] COMMENT
Grubbs alleged that two doctors at the hospital where the relator was
employed were involved in a fraudulent scheme and had instructed the 
relator to participate in the scheme.183 The relator alleged several details
of the fraudulent scheme in the complaint,184 and the court reasoned that
the particulars of fraudulent conduct are often harbored in the scheme,
whether there is a specific claim pled or not.185 The court analogized a 
“claim for payment” to a “hand in a cookie jar,” indicating that the specific
claim itself does not amount to fraud without details of a scheme to submit
false claims.186 Using this standard, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a 
complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) if it includes particular details of a fraudulent
scheme paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference the
claims were submitted, even if the relator cannot allege details of a
particular false claim.187 
The Seventh Circuit has also rejected the argument that a complaint
requires a representative sample of a false claim.188 In United States ex rel. 
Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corporation, the relator was an engineer for Rolls-
Royce for nine years.189 In the complaint, the relator alleged that Rolls-
Royce was improperly making parts and falsely telling the United States
that the engines conformed to the government’s specifications.190 The 
district court held that the relator needed to have “at least one of Rolls-
Royce’s billing packages” to meet the Rule 9(b) standard.191 However, the 
Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the complaint sufficient because it
alleged details of the fraudulent scheme, even though the relator did not
have personal knowledge of the details of particular fraudulent claims.192 
The Tenth Circuit has also rejected the representative-sample
approach, holding in United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah,
Inc. that a plaintiff is “not required to provide a factual basis for every
183. Id. at 184.
184. See id. The relator in Grubbs alleged that both defendants invited the 
relator to a dinner, where the defendants allegedly divulged to the relator their
fraudulent billing scheme and instructed the relator on how to participate in the
scheme.
185. Id. at 190.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849 (7th Cir.
2009).
189. See id. at 850.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 854.
192. Id.
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382 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
allegation.”193 The relators in Lemmon were former employees of a
government contractor who brought claims under the FCA, alleging that
the contractor violated its contractual and regulatory obligations by
improperly disposing of hazardous waste and falsely representing to the
government that it fulfilled its obligations.194 While the relators did not
include examples of specific false claims in the complaint, the Tenth
Circuit held that Rule 9(b) is satisfied as long as the relator provides details
of the fraudulent scheme and an adequate basis for a reasonable inference
that false claims were submitted.195 
The Ninth Circuit in Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz also 
applied the standard set forth in Grubbs.196 The Ninth Circuit declined to 
adopt the district court’s “categorical” approach, which would require a
relator to submit representative samples of a false claim to support their
allegations.197 The language in Ebeid is identical to the language in
Grubbs; the Ninth Circuit held that it is sufficient to allege particular
details of a fraudulent scheme paired with reliable indicia that lead to a
strong inference that claims were actually submitted to satisfy Rule 9(b).198 
Lastly, the Third Circuit has also adopted the standard set forth in
Grubbs.199 In United States ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Management, 
LLC, a relator brought a qui tam action under the FCA against a dialysis-
service care company, alleging the company submitted fraudulent claims
for reimbursement for a prescription drug to Medicare.200 The district court
dismissed the claim, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding that a relator
satisfies Rule 9(b)’s standards by alleging particular details of a scheme to
submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong
inference the claims were actually submitted.201 
193. United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163,
1173 (10th Cir. 2010). The 10th Circuit reasoned that the complaint must provide
enough information to describe a fraudulent scheme to support a plausible
inference that false claims were submitted.
194. Id. at 1166.
195. Id. at 1172.
196. Ebeid ex rel. United States ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d
993 (9th Cir. 2010).
197. Id. at 998.
198. Id. at 998–99. The Court in Ebeid quoted the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in
Grubbs, finding that particular details of a fraudulent scheme paired with reliable 
indicia that lead to a strong inference that false claims were actually submitted
satisfy Rule 9(b).
199. See United States ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d
153 (3rd Cir. 2014).
200. See id. at 154.
201. See id. at 157–58.
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  387 11/19/21  12:02 PM




     
   
   
    
    
  
  








    
   
   
 
    
  
   
  
 
    
 
      
     
      
     
    
    
   
      
      
         
      
  
      
      
3832021] COMMENT
What these cases all have in common is that the relator did not plead
and was not required to identify a specific false claim that was submitted
to the government.202 Instead, the courts adopted a standard that satisfied
Rule 9(b) without identifying any sort of claim that would create liability
under the Act.203 The courts reasoned that a jury could potentially find that
the defendant submitted false claims to the government by analyzing the
fraudulent scheme paired with reliable indicia.204 However, this is not the
standard under the FCA, which provides liability only for defendants
shown to have submitted a specific false claim for payment.205 By placing 
emphasis on details of a fraudulent scheme—which would fall under the
third element, the defendant’s knowledge of the falsity—these courts fail
to identify the most important part of the FCA.206 
IV. PLEADING A SPECIFIC CLAIM WITH PARTICULARITY
The application of different pleading standards in different circuits
highlights the importance of applying the correct pleading standard to each 
element of an FCA violation.207 Failure to develop a uniform pleading 
requirement for qui tam actions has led to inconsistent results, even
sometimes in the same circuit.208 Additionally, courts placing emphasis on
a defendant’s fraudulent scheme have failed to emphasize the liability-
creating element of an FCA claim: that a false claim was submitted to the
government.209 A uniform standard requiring a relator to identify a specific
claim for payment will resolve these issues and correctly apply Rules 8(a)
and 9(b) to the proper element of an FCA violation.210 Admittedly, a strict
representative-sample approach would be at odds with the Fifth Circuit,
where the court stated that Rule 9(b)’s ultimate meaning is context-
specific and that there is no single application of Rule 9(b) that applies in
202. See generally United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180
(5th Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849
(7th Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614
F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010); Ebeid, 616 F.3d 993; Foglia, 754 F.3d 153.
203. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A).
204. Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 189–90.
205. Id.
206. See infra Section V.B.
207. See supra Section III.A–B.
208. Compare United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d
552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006), with United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood
of the Heartland, 765 F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2014).
209. See supra Section III.B.
210. See infra Section V.D.
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384 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
all contexts.211 Regardless, the Supreme Court’s announcement of a
uniform standard across all circuits is necessary given the increasing
amount of money budgeted to fund healthcare and military projects.212 
A. Relators Must Identify a Specific Claim for Payment
The best way to satisfy the purposes of Rule 9(b) is to require
identification of a specific claim for payment.213 Requiring a particular
claim for payment in the relator’s complaint satisfies Rule 9(b)’s stated
objectives of “ensuring the complaint provides defendants with fair notice 
of the plaintiffs’ claims, protects defendants from harm to their reputation
and goodwill, reduces the number of strike suits, and prevents plaintiffs
from filing baseless claims then attempting to discover unknown
wrongs.”214 Additionally, requiring a relator to plead a specific claim for
payment is consistent with the statutory language of the Act.215 
The FCA contains an express presentment provision,216 which the 
Eleventh Circuit has described as the sine qua non of an FCA violation.217 
The relaxed circuits have erred in allowing details of a defendant’s
fraudulent scheme to satisfy the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) in
lieu of identifying a specific claim.218 The defendant’s fraudulent scheme 
may be sufficient to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the claim’s
falsity, which is the third element of a violation, but that sufficiency does
not negate the requirement that there must be a claim submitted to the
government to establish any form of liability.219 
Relators pushing for a relaxed pleading standard cite numerous
reasons for warranting a lower pleading requirement, and an oft-cited 
211. United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 188 (5th Cir.
2009) (citing Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1997)).
212. See ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 1.
213. See infra Section IV.A.
214. See Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190.
215. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2018).
216. See § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2018); see also United States ex rel. Nathan v.
Takeda Pharm. N.A., Inc., 707 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013) (“In order for a defendant
to be liable, the False Claims Act requires that a claim must have actually been
submitted to the Federal Government for payment.”).
217. See Hopper v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301,
1311 (11th Cir. 2002)).
218. See generally Grubbs, 565 F.3d 180.
219. See generally § 3729.
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3852021] COMMENT
reason is informational asymmetries220 between the defendant and 
relator.221 However, with the 2009 FERA Amendments, this issue is not
as prevalent as it once was.222 
B. CIDs Eliminate Informational Asymmetries
The government’s use of CIDs combined with a broadened power to
share this information with relators makes any argument citing
informational asymmetries questionable.223 It is true that when a relator
initially files a complaint under seal, they may not have access to any
specific claims for payment submitted to the government.224 However,
once the government takes over the investigation, the relator’s complaint
is merely used to point the DOJ in the right direction.225 The DOJ can then 
use the information it discovers through CIDs or pre-election investigation
and choose to intervene or allow the relator to continue in the action
alone.226 If the latter situation occurs, the DOJ can share with the relator
any and all information it uncovers, and the relator can supplement the
initial complaint filed under seal to include this information to meet the
particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).227 There are courts that have
relaxed the 9(b) standards whenever the information is expressly in the
defendant’s control,228 but this does not warrant lowering the pleading
requirements. With the government’s expanded use of CIDs and the fact
that this information can be relayed to the relator even if the government
does not intervene, informational asymmetries—if they exist at all—are 
no longer a significant issue.
220. When a relator or court discusses informational asymmetries in the 
context of an FCA violation, this refers to the fact that a relator does not have
access to the information that should be in the complaint.
221. See Jetson Leder-Luis, Whistleblowers, Private Enforcement, and
Medicare Fraud, https://economics.mit.edu/files/18187 [https://perma.cc/3CMQ-
3CZG] (last visited Jan. 8, 2021). 
222. See generally Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
223. See generally Colin T. Reardon, Pleading in the Information Age, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2170 (2010).
224. See generally id. at 2203.
225. See Lockman, supra note 52, at 1601 (“rather than casting his own nets, 
he entrusts the fishing to a third party, and a master angler indeed: the DOJ”).
226. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3733.
227. See generally Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009.
228. See United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854
(7th Cir. 2009).
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  390 11/19/21  12:02 PM




   
    
 
  
    
    
    







   
   
  
    
  
   
    
  
    
  
 
       
  
    
    
         
 
   







    
     
386 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
C. Improper Focus on Status of the Relator
Some courts have also considered the status of the relator, particularly
whether the relator has access to the defendant’s billing practices, as proof
that the relator has knowledge that claims were submitted to the
government.229 Arguments in favor of using the status of the relator as one 
of many factors are sufficient; but giving a relator’s complaint more
weight based solely on the relator’s position in the company, in the
absence of a specific claim for payment pled, is improper.230 In practice,
courts using the relator’s status—whether a corporate insider or regular
employee—have improperly considered the relator’s job status.231 In
Thayer, the Eighth Circuit held that a relator had personal, firsthand
knowledge of the submission of false claims, though lacking
representative samples, because the relator oversaw Planned Parenthood’s
billing and claims system.232 In contrast, the Eighth Circuit recognized that
the relator in Joshi was an anesthesiologist who had no connection to the
hospital’s billing department or records.233 
The difference in the status of the relators in Thayer and Joshi, 
respectively, was ultimately the difference in satisfying the pleading
requirements in each case.234 The Eighth Circuit’s consideration of the
relator’s status as a corporate insider pushed an otherwise insufficient
complaint to the level of sufficient in Thayer.235 However, this approach
is improper, as it does not consider the use of the government’s
investigation or the uniqueness of the FCA itself.236 Simply because a
relator has work history in the defendant’s billing department does not
229. See generally United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the
Heartland, 765 F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2014).
230. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
231. See generally Thayer, 765 F.3d 914.
232. Id. at 917 (discussing United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc.,
441 F.3d 552, 557 (8th Cir. 2006)).
233. Id.
234. See Joshi, 441 F.3d at 556 (“[Relator] failed to allege with any specificity
the particular circumstances constituting . . . alleged fraudulent conduct”); but see
Thayer, 765 F.3d 914, 917 (“[Relator] was able to plead personal, first-hand
knowledge of Planned Parenthood’s submission of false claims. In these 
circumstances, we find persuasive the approach of those circuits that have
concluded that a relator can satisfy Rule 9(b) by ‘alleging particular details of a 
scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong
inference that claims were actually submitted.’”).
235. Thayer, 765 F.3d at 919.
236. See generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.
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3872021] COMMENT
automatically result in an inference that false claims were submitted.237 To 
be sure, the court in Joshi stated that “an insider might have an easier time
obtaining information about billing practices and meeting the pleading
requirements under the [FCA], [but] neither the Federal Rules nor the FCA
offer . . . leniency under these particular circumstances.”238 Accordingly, 
courts must still apply Rule 9(b) to the first two elements, identifying a
claim for payment and that the claim was false, and then require the relator
to plead enough facts that make the defendant’s knowledge of the falsity
plausible.239 Lowering the particularity standard depending on the relator’s
job description goes against the purpose of the statute.240 
D. DOJ Favors Heightened Particularity
Proponents of lowering pleading requirements for claims under the
FCA fail to consider that the DOJ expressly rejected an amendment in
2007 that would have exempted qui tam complaints from Rule 9(b)’s
heightened pleading standard altogether.241 The House of Representatives 
proposed a legislative amendment in 2007 that included a serious
relaxation of pleading requirements under the FCA.242 The proposed 
legislation can be read as fundamentally altering the application of Rule
9(b) to FCA claims.243 Under the amendment, a relator would sufficiently
237. See generally Joshi, 441 F.3d 560.
238. Id. The court described “these circumstances” as when the relator failed
to allege the defendant’s fraudulent conduct with the required specificity.
239. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
240. Id.
241. See Lockman, supra note 52, at 1578; see also Letter from Keith B.
Nelson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable John
Conyers Jr., Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, US House of
Representatives (July 15, 2008), in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Archives, https://
www.justice.gov/archive/ola/views-letters/110-2/07-15-08-hr4854-false-claims-
act-correc tion-act.pdf [http://perma.cc/U6HZ-W66E].
242. See False Claims Correction Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 4854, 110th Cong.
§ 4(e) (2007):
In pleading an action brought under section 3730(b), a person shall not
be required to identify specific claims that result from an alleged course
of misconduct if the facts alleged in the complaint, if ultimately proven
true, would provide a reasonable indication that one or more violations
of section 3729 are likely to have occurred, and if the allegations in the 
pleading provide adequate notice of the specific nature of the alleged
misconduct to permit the Government effectively to investigate and
defendants fairly to defend the allegations made.
243. See id.
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388 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
plead a qui tam action so long as the allegations provided notice to the
defendant of the nature of the misconduct, without requiring the relator to
indicate that a specific claim for payment was submitted.244 In a 2008
memo, the Deputy Attorney General, Keith Nelson, expressed the DOJ’s
concerns with the proposed amendment.245 Deputy Attorney General
Keith Nelson noted that the proposed amendment would increase overall
costs associated with government contracting by federal agencies,
including increased discovery and litigation costs with unmeritorious qui
tam litigation.246 Moreover, the proposed amendment would appear to
permit a relator to claim a share of non-fraud recovery, which is contrary
to the purpose of the FCA’s reward system.247 
The DOJ ultimately expressed that the FCA has “worked well” in its
present form and determined that there was no need for major
amendments.248 Qui tam actions that fail to allege fraud with adequate
particularity can waste the government’s resources; therefore, the DOJ
opposed this attempt to exempt qui tam actions from the requirements of
Rule 9(b).249 The DOJ’s opposition to lowering or exempting qui tam
actions from Rule 9(b) highlights even further that a standard requiring a
specific claim for payment is warranted. The DOJ sees the FCA as an
essential tool to combat fraud against the government, yet this tool should
not be used as a method of bringing unmeritorious claims to mine
discovery or share in the profits as a relator. Considering that liability
derives from a claim for payment, that informational asymmetries are
essentially nonexistent, and that the DOJ strongly opposes lowering
pleading requirements, the lenient approach is flawed.
V. PLAUSIBLY PLEADING THE DEFENDANT’S SCHEME
Congress wrote the FCA to expressly require knowledge of
“information” regarding a false claim.250 This requirement is necessary to 
carry out Congress’s clear intent that the FCA—a “quasi-criminal”
244. See id.
245. See Letter from Keith B. Nelson, supra note 241.
246. See id.
247. The purpose of the FCA’s reward system, which provides relators with a
percentage of the amount recovered in court, is to promote the Government’s
ability to recover losses due to fraud and to give private citizens the incentive to
inform the Government of difficult-to-detect fraud. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b).
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3892021] COMMENT
statute251 that imposes “essentially punitive” remedies—not be used as a
vehicle for either punishing honest mistakes or incorrect claims submitted
through mere negligence.252 
A. “Information” Means Specific Claim, Not Fraudulent Scheme
While no specific intent to defraud is required to violate the Act, the
Act defines “knowledge” as: (1) “actual knowledge,” (2) “deliberate
ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information,” or (3) “reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.”253 The information
referred to in the statute, when interpreting what creates liability under the
Act, must be a specific claim for payment.254 Thus, the knowledge element
may only be satisfied when a defendant has knowledge of a claim
submitted to the government, not just an underlying scheme.255 This does
not mean that details of the defendant’s fraudulent scheme need not be
pled; however, these details alone do not satisfy the particularity
requirements of Rule 9(b) and should be evaluated in accordance with the
plausibility standard of Rule 8(a) based on Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Iqbal.256 
B. Conditions of the Mind and Defendant’s Knowledge of the Scheme
The second sentence of Rule 9(b) states that conditions of the mind
can be averred generally.257 In Iqbal, the Court stated that the word
“generally” in Rule 9(b) is a relative term, requiring comparison to the
particularity requirement when pleading fraud or mistake.258 The Rule 
merely excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent under an
elevated pleading standard and does not give the party license to evade the
less rigid—though still operative—strictures of Rule 8(a).259 Accordingly, 
Rule 8(a) does not empower a party to plead bare elements of a cause of
251. United States ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir.
2006).
252. See United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1274
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-3345, at 6, 19 (1986)).
253. § 3729(b)(1).
254. See generally § 3729.
255. Id.
256. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686–87 (2009).
257. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
258. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686.
259. Id. at 686–87.
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390 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
action and survive a motion to dismiss.260 With the language of Iqbal in 
mind, the intent requirement under the FCA must be held to a different
standard than the first two elements of a violation. The first two elements,
that a claim was made and that the claim was false, must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s 
particularity standard by identifying a specific claim for payment
submitted to the government.261 Element three, the defendant’s knowledge
of the claim’s falsity, need only meet the plausibility requirements of
Rule 8(a).262 Courts opting for the lenient approach, which only requires
details of a fraudulent scheme paired with reliable indicia, have failed to
draw this distinction.263 Specifically, in Grubbs, the Fifth Circuit noted
that raw bills—even with numbers, dates, and amounts—are not fraud
without an underlying scheme to submit the bills for unperformed or
unnecessary work.264 The court then noted that it is the scheme in which
particular circumstances constituting fraud may be found that make it
highly likely the fraud was consummated through presentment of false
bills.265 
The Grubbs analysis is troublesome for two reasons. First, the
fraudulent scheme is analogous to the intent element of an FCA
violation.266 The defendant must possess knowledge that an underlying 
scheme exists and that the scheme itself is fraudulent. As noted in Iqbal, 
however, knowledge and conditions of the mind are held to a different
pleading standard than Rule 9(b)’s particularity standard.267 This means
that the defendant’s knowledge of a fraudulent scheme must meet the
plausibility standard of Rule 8(a),268 and this knowledge alone cannot
constitute an FCA violation in the absence of identifying a specific claim.
260. See id.
261. Id. at 687 (“Rule 8 does not empower respondent to plead the bare
elements of [the] cause of action, affix the label ‘general allegation,’ and expect
[the] complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.”). The distinctions between Rule 
8(a)’s and Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirements are critical in FCA claims. Allowing
a relator to proceed to discovery without identifying a specific claim for payment
contradicts the plain language of the FCA.
262. See generally id. at 686–87. When discussing Rule 9(b), the Court
reasoned that Rule 9(b)’s “generally” requirement does not authorize a plaintiff
to avoid the strictures of Rule 8(a). 
263. See generally United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180
(5th Cir. 2009).
264. Id. at 190.
265. Id.
266. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1). The Act explicitly states that no
specific intent to defraud is required.
267. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
268. Id.
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3912021] COMMENT
Second, once the relator pleads sufficient facts to make it plausible that the
defendant engaged in a fraudulent scheme, there are still two other
elements of an FCA violation that must be satisfied for liability to attach.269 
The allegations that a claim was submitted to the government and that the
claim was false are evaluated under the particularity requirement of Rule
9(b).270 Allowing a relator’s pleading to allege details of a fraudulent
scheme and then using those details to satisfy the heightened particularity
requirement of Rule 9(b) undermines any force that Rule 9(b) carries in
the first place. Pleading details of a fraudulent scheme is a fundamental
part of an FCA violation, but pleading these details without any specific
claim for payment submitted to the government does not amount to a
violation under the Act.271 The knowledge requirement of the statute also
requires a defendant to have knowledge of the “information.”272 Pleading 
details of a defendant’s fraudulent scheme is insufficient to satisfy this
requirement without any specific claim presented to the government.273 As
mentioned above, the Act imposes liability on a specific claim for payment
submitted.274 It follows that the “information” referred to in the statute 
requires the defendant to have knowledge of a specific claim for payment
submitted, not only a fraudulent scheme.275 
Not only does relying solely on a defendant’s fraudulent scheme fail
to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements, but it also creates
additional problems. In Twombly, the Court noted that at the pleading
stage, in the context of an antitrust conspiracy, a plaintiff must plausibly
suggest an agreement between the defendants.276 In making a 
determination of whether the allegations were plausible, the Court was
unwilling to infer that a conspiracy occurred simply because allegations
were consistent with that behavior.277 The Court stated that there was an
obvious alternative explanation for the defendants’ conduct and refused to 
infer that the complaint stated a plausible claim for relief.278 This reasoning
rings true in the context of FCA violations as well.279 
269. See Mitchell, supra note 47, at 367.
270. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B).
271. See generally id. § 3729.
272. Id. § 3729(b)(1).
273. See generally id. § 3729.
274. Id.
275. Id.; see also id. §§ 3730–3733.
276. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).
277. Id. at 554.
278. Id. at 568.
279. See infra Section V.C.
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C. Reasonable Alternative Explanation 
The Fifth Circuit wrestled with precisely this issue in United States ex
rel. Integra Med Analytics, LLC v. Baylor Scott & White Health.280 Here,
the court dismissed a relator’s FCA claims that used statistical data to
establish a fraudulent scheme against the defendant, stating that although
the defendant’s practices were consistent with the submission of
“fraudulent Medicare reimbursement claims to the government,” they
were also consistent with the defendant simply “being ahead of most
[other] healthcare providers in following new guidelines from CMS.”281 
The Fifth Circuit held that the relator’s allegations regarding medically
unnecessary treatments and statements made by former employees failed
to satisfy Rule 9(b) because the allegations were conclusory and “fail[ed]
to state the content of” any allegedly fraudulent directives or guidance.282 
This case highlights the problems that arise whenever a relator focuses
solely on a defendant’s fraudulent scheme283 and can easily be reconciled
with Twombly. The Twombly case clarifies that there will be no liability
whenever there is an obvious alternative explanation for the defendant’s
conduct.284 By allowing a relator to plead only a defendant’s fraudulent
scheme and using that scheme to satisfy the particularity requirements of
Rule 9(b), courts expand the meaning of the FCA to potentially create
liability under the Act whenever no claim for payment was submitted. This
has the potential to unfairly affect defendants who complied with the law
and exhibited conduct consistent with a perfectly legal alternative
explanation. Thus, it is imperative that relators plead a specific claim for
payment submitted to the government.
D. Reconciling Rules 8(a) and 9(b)
Strictly applying Rule 9(b) to the first two elements of an FCA
violation helps to reconcile Rule 9(b) with Rule 8(a). Rule 9(b) provides
that knowledge, malice, and intent can be alleged generally;285 and the
language of the FCA states that “no specific intent to defraud is
required.”286 Because of this language, Rule 9(b) need not apply to the
280. United States ex rel. Integra Med Analytics, LLC v. Baylor Scott & White
Health, 816 Fed. App’x 892 (5th Cir. 2020).
281. Id. at 897.
282. Id. at 899.
283. Id. at 892.
284. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007).
285. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
286. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1).
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third element of an FCA claim—whether the defendant had knowledge of
the falsity. If Rule 9(b) requires particularity when alleging fraud, then the
only logical conclusion is that “generally” in the second sentence of Rule
9(b) means that the plausibility standard established in Twombly and Iqbal
should apply to the defendant’s knowledge of the claim’s falsity. Under
this standard, claims under the FCA will be evaluated properly and
defendants will not face the stigma that inevitably comes with allegations
of fraud, avoiding any negative consequences for defendants in FCA suits
and deterring relators from riling meritless claims. If, after the DOJ
investigation, a relator is unable to point to a specific claim for payment
to the government, then the relator should not be entitled to proceed to
discovery to uncover something that the DOJ was unable to find. This
would undoubtedly waste resources and cause an undue burden on
defendants.
However, it is important to understand the truth to the Fifth Circuit’s
statements in Grubbs.287 The court recognized that raw bills, standing
alone, are not fraud without an underlying scheme to submit the bills for
unperformed or unnecessary work.288 This is logical in the sense that there 
may be a perfectly plausible alternative explanation for the specific
claim’s falsity. Relators should be required to not only identify specific
false claims submitted to satisfy Rule 9(b) but also plead the details of a
defendant’s fraudulent scheme plausibly under Rule 8(a). This framework
satisfies the pleading requirements for civil actions in federal courts and
demonstrates why the defendant is or is not liable under the FCA.
CONCLUSION
Healthcare and military spending combined account for trillions of
dollars of the United States government’s annual budget.289 The FCA is 
certainly an attractive and effective tool to combat the rampant fraud that
could occur because of the large number of government contracts.290 
287. See United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180 (5th Cir.
2009).
288. Id. at 190.
289. See ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 1; see also Kimberly Amadeo, US
Military Budget, Its Components, Challenges, and Growth, THE BALANCE (Sept. 3, 
2020), https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-military-budget-components-challenges-
growth-3306320 [https://perma.cc/NZY7-UN6T].
290. The federal government spends about $500 billion each year on contracts
– that’s roughly the size of Sweden’s economy, USASPENDING, https://datalab
.usaspending.gov/contract-explorer/ [https://perma.cc/G7KR-TKSU] (last visited
Jan. 27, 2021).
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However, the trend toward relaxing the pleading requirements for these
claims does not adequately consider the complexity and uniqueness of
FCA claims or potential adverse impacts that a meritless FCA claim could
have on an FCA defendant.291 Moreover, courts improperly focus on the 
status of the relator or informational asymmetries when allowing claims
that fail to identify a specific false claim to proceed to discovery. The
purpose of the FCA is not to provide relators with an easy, sure-fire way
to share in the profits of a settlement.292 Rather, the purpose of the FCA is
to uncover actual fraud against the United States.293 This purpose is best
served by requiring courts to apply the proper pleading standard to each
element of an FCA violation, conserving DOJ resources and maximizing 
the success of FCA claims. The Supreme Court should grant certiorari and
resolve this issue once and for all. With potentially millions of dollars on
the table in terms of the relator’s share of recovery, requiring relators to
identify the sine qua non of an FCA violation—a claim for payment—is a 
reasonable condition. The proposed standard will save resources and
prevent the negative stigma surrounding allegations of fraud for those who
contract with the U.S. government.
291. Lockman, supra note 52, at 1571 (“agency officials have broad discretion
to temporarily debar or permanently suspend a government contractor after a
finding of FCA liability”).
292. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
293. Id.
